Introduction
Virtualized environments are becoming increasingly ubiquitous with the growing proliferation of virtualized data centers and cloud environments. However, security concerns are still one of the greatest showstoppers for the wide adoption of cloud computing [23] . Attackers are actively exploring virtualization-specific attack surfaces, such as hypervisors. Attacks targeting hypervisors are of high severity since they may result in crashing the hypervisors including all guest VMs (virtual machines) running on top of them or in altering hypervisors' memory.
A malicious guest VM user may execute an attack against the underlying hypervisor via hypercalls, which are software traps from a kernel of a fully or partially paravirtualized guest VM to the hypervisor. Hypercalls enable intrusion into vulnerable hypervisors initiated from a malicious guest VM kernel. As Rutkowska et al. [25] demonstrate, the exploitation of a vulnerability of a hypercall handler (i.e., a hypercall vulnerability) may lead to altering the memory of the targeted hypervisor, which enables, for example, the execution of malicious code with hypervisor privilege.
Given the severity of attacks triggering hypercall vulnerabilities, the characterization of the hypercall attack surface is a priority since it is crucial for better understanding the security threats posed by hypercall interfaces. The lack of such an understanding significantly hinders advances towards monitoring and securing these interfaces. In-depth technical information on hypercall vulnerabilities is a requirement for characterizing the hypercall attack surface. However, such information is currently very limited. Publicly disclosed vulnerability reports describing hypercall vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2013-4494, CVE-2013-3898) are typically the sole source of information and provide only high-level descriptions. There is also no publicly available information on attacks triggering hypercall vulnerabilities performed in practice.
The goal of this work is to provide technical information on hypercall vulnerabilities needed for the improvement of the security of hypercall interfaces (e.g., information on the errors that caused the vulnerabilities and how the vulnerabilities can be triggered). To this end, we analyzed all publicly disclosed hypercall vulnerabilities that we found by searching major CVE (Common Vulnerability and Exposures) report databases (e.g., cvedetails [22] ) based on relevant keywords, such as names of operations of hypercalls. In this work, we focus on the vulnerabilities described in the vulnerability reports CVE-2012-3494, CVE-2012-3495, CVE-2012-3496, CVE-2012-4539, CVE-2012-5510, CVE-2012-5513, CVE-2012 -5525, and CVE-2013 -1964 . These vulnerabilities are representative of the vulnerabilities that we analyzed in terms of the errors causing them and the ways in which they can be triggered. The vulnerabilities considered in this work are from the Xen hypervisor [20] , which has the most extensive hypercall interface as opposed to other hypervisors, such as KVM [24] . The considered vulnerabilities are in the handlers of the hypercalls memory op, gnttab op, set debugreg, physdev op, and mmuext op.
Our approach for analyzing a hypercall vulnerability consisted of the following steps: (i) analysis of the CVE report describing the vulnerability and other relevant information sources, for example, security advisories; (ii) reverse engineering of the released patch fixing the vulnerability, and (iii) developing proof-of-concept code for triggering the vulnerability. For each considered vulnerability, we provide background information essential for understanding the vulnerability, and information on the vulnerable hypercall handler (i.e., information about the workflow, and input and output data of the handler) and the error causing the vulnerability. We also show how the vulnerability can be triggered and discuss the state of the targeted hypervisor after the vulnerability has been triggered.
We stress that we provide information on a vulnerable hypercall handler to the extent that is relevant for understanding a given vulnerability, for example, we discuss only some input parameters of the handler. We also stress that we do not provide proof-of-concept code for triggering the considered vulnerabilities ready for use. We present only the hypercalls executed as part of an attack triggering a given hypercall vulnerability, and the values of relevant hypercall parameters (i.e., parameters identifying the executed hypercalls and, where applicable, parameters with values specifically crafted for triggering the vulnerability). Finally, we stress that we do not demonstrate vulnerability exploitation where it is possible (e.g., malicious code execution). We focus instead on the errors causing the considered vulnerabilities, the activities for triggering them, and the effects of triggering the vulnerabilities on the state of the vulnerable hypervisors. We argue that the information that we provide is relevant for better understanding the security threats that hypercall interfaces pose, which will help to focus approaches for improving the security of hypervisors.
Information on hypercall vulnerabilities 2.1 Hypercall memory op
The memory op hypercall is used for managing the memory of a guest VM, for example, altering the layout of a given memory region. 2 In the handler of memory op, the different types of memory addresses that the Xen hypervisor supports for abstracting physical memory available to guest VMs are used for accessing locations in memory:
• virtual address -an address of a location in the virtual memory of a guest VM;
• GPFN (Guest Pseudo-Physical Frame Number) -an address of a page frame that is a physical memory address from the perspective of a guest VM; • GMFN (Guest Machine Frame Number) -an address of a page frame that is a machine address from the perspective of a guest VM; • MFN (Machine Frame Number) -an address of a page frame that is a real machine address.
For accessing contiguous memory blocks, the different types of addresses mentioned above are used for accessing extents of a given order such that an extent consists of 2 order memory pages.
Mappings between the different types of memory addresses are stored in tables for that purpose. Mappings between virtual addresses and GPFNs are stored in a page table, between  GPFNs and GMFNs in a physical-to-machine table, and between GMFNs and GPFNs in a  machine-to-physical table. We refer to reader to [18] and [21] for further information on how the Xen hypervisor manages memory.
Vulnerability CVE-2012-3496
"XENMEM populate physmap in Xen 4.0, 4.1, and 4.2, and Citrix XenServer 6.0.2 and earlier, when translating paging mode is not used, allows local PV OS guest kernels to cause a denial of service (BUG triggered and host crash) via invalid flags such as MEMF populate on demand." [3] XENMEM populate physmap is an operation of the memory op hypercall, which is used for requesting extents from the hypervisor. XENMEM populate physmap is also used for marking extents as "populate-on-demand". Extents marked as "populate-on-demand" can be assigned to the physical memory of a given guest VM, or removed from it, on demand at run time.
Input: 3 XENMEM populate physmap takes as input a structure of type xen memory reservation. which is defined as: Section 2. Information on hypercall vulnerabilities struct xen memory reservation { GUEST HANDLE(xen pfn t) extent start; unsigned int extent order; unsigned int address bits; . . . } extent start stores the virtual address of the head of an array that contains memory addresses (GPFNs) at which the extents obtained from the hypervisor are to be mapped, or addresses (GPFNs) of the beginnings of the extents that are to be marked as "populate-ondemand"; extent order stores the order of a single extent; address bits stores the flags of the XENMEM populate physmap hypercall operation, one of which is MEMF populate on demand. MEMF populate on demand is enabled when XENMEM populate physmap is used for marking extents as "populate-on-demand".
Output: 3 On success, XENMEM populate physmap returns the number of the obtained extents or of the extents marked as "populate-on-demand". In case XENMEM populate physmap has been used for obtaining extents, the array that starts at the virtual address stored in extent start is populated with the memory addresses (MFNs) of the beginnings of the obtained extents. On failure, XENMEM populate physmap returns an error code (typically a negative integer value).
Workflow Description of the vulnerability: In guest physmap mark populate on demand, a function invoked in the handler of XENMEM populate physmap, the BUG ON macro is used for checking whether the guest VM from where the memory op hypercall has been invoked has the "translated paging" mode disabled. BUG ON is a macro that crashes the system where it is executed if the condition that it evaluates is true. If guest physmap mark populate on demand is invoked from a paravirtualized guest VM (note that paravirtualized guest VMs have the "translated paging" mode disabled by default), the condition that the BUG ON macro evaluates is true and the hypervisor crashes. Thus, CVE-2012-3496 can be triggered by invoking the XENMEM populate physmap hypercall operation, with the MEMF populate on demand flag enabled, from a paravirtualized guest VM.
Vulnerability fix: A patch fixing the vulnerability CVE-2012-3496 was released on 5 September 2012 and is available at [12] . The patch replaces the BUG ON macro with an if clause.
Triggering CVE-2012-3496: We triggered CVE-2012-3496 in the following environment:
Section 2. Information on hypercall vulnerabilities
• guest VM: OS -Debian Squeeze (64 bit), kernel -2.6.32-5-amd64;
• host VM: OS -Debian Squeeze (64 bit), kernel -2.6.32-5-amd64;
• hypervisor: Xen 4.1.0.
The attack that we executed is depicted in Figure 2 .1. Post-attack state of the hypervisor: The hypervisor crashes when the BUG ON macro is executed.
Guest

Vulnerability CVE-2012-5513
"The XENMEM exchange handler in Xen 4.2 and earlier does not properly check the memory address, which allows local PV guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly gain privileges via unspecified vectors that overwrite memory in the hypervisor reserved range." [6] XENMEM exchange is an operation of the memory op hypercall, which is used for modifying the layout of a memory region of a guest VM by "exchanging" extents between the guest VM and the hypervisor. The latter is performed by remapping a set of memory addresses (GPFNs) of beginnings of extents of the guest VM to memory addresses (GMFNs) of beginnings of extents, requested by the guest VM and allocated by the hypervisor for the "exchange" operation. For instance, XENMEM exchange can be used for defragmenting memory such that, for example, 2 extents consisting of 2 pages are exchanged for a single extent consisting of 4 pages.
Input: 4 XENMEM exchange takes as input a structure of type xen memory exchange defined as: struct xen memory exchange { struct xen memory reservation in; struct xen memory reservation out; xen ulong t nr exchanged; } , where xen memory reservation is defined as: The fields of the (struct xen memory exchange) in structure store information about the extents that are to be "exchanged". in.nr extents stores the number of extents to be "exchanged"; in.extent start stores the virtual address of the head of an array that contains the memory addresses (GMFNs) of the beginnings of the extents to be "exchanged"; in.extent order stores the order of a single extent.
The fields of the (struct xen memory exchange) out structure store information about the extents requested from the hypervisor. out.nr extents stores the number of requested extents; out.extent order stores the order of a single requested extent; out.extent start stores the virtual address of the head of an array that consists of GPFNs at which the requested extents are to be mapped in guest VM's memory.
Output: 4 On success, XENMEM exchange returns 0. The array that starts at the address stored in (struct xen memory exchange) out.extent start is populated with the memory addresses (GMFNs) of the beginnings of the extents allocated by the hypervisor for the "exchange" operation. On failure, XENMEM exchange returns an error code (typically a negative integer value).
Workflow of the vulnerable hypercall handler: 4 do memory op (XENMEM exchange, (struct xen memory exchange) exch) call memory exchange (XENMEM exchange, (struct xen memory exchange) exch) . . . allocate extent(s) of 2 exch.in.order pages store the addresses (GMFNs) of the beginnings of the allocated extents in array mfn . . . call copy to guest offset(...)
populate memory beginning at exch.out.extent start with the GMFNs in mfn return . . . return return Description of the vulnerability: The function copy to guest offset(to, offset, from, size), which is invoked in the handler of the XENMEM exchange hypercall operation, copies data from a virtual address in hypervisor context (from) to a virtual address in guest VM context (to). For the sake of performance, copy to guest offset(to, offset, from, size) did not perform value validation of the from and to parameters. As a result, a malicious VM user can invoke copy to guest offset(to, offset, from, size) such that to is an address reserved for use by the hypervisor, which leads to overwriting hypervisor's memory. CVE-2012-5513 can be triggered by invoking the XENMEM exchange hypercall operation with an address reserved for use by the hypervisor stored in the (struct xen memory exchange) out.extent start parameter.
Vulnerability fix: A patch fixing the vulnerability CVE-2012-5513 was released on 3 December 2012 and is available at [15] . The patch inserts an invocation of the function guest handle okay in the handler of the XENMEM exchange hypercall operation, which validates the values of the from and to parameters of copy to guest offset. For instance, a valid virtual address is an address that is not reserved for use by the hypervisor.
Triggering CVE-2012-5513: We triggered CVE-2012-5513 in the following environment:
• guest VM -OS: Debian Squeeze (64 bit), kernel 2.6.32-5-amd64; Section 2. Information on hypercall vulnerabilities • host VM -OS: Debian Squeeze (64 bit), kernel 2.6.32-5-amd64;
• hypervisor -Xen 4.1.0.
The attack that we executed is depicted in Figure 2 .2. Post-attack state of the hypervisor: When CVE-2012-5513 is triggered, the memory region of the hypervisor beginning at the address stored in (struct xen memory exchange) out.extent start is overwritten with the memory addresses (GMFNs) of the beginnings of the extents allocated by the hypervisor for the "exchange" operation. Thus, an attacker cannot control the values with which the hypervisor's memory is overwritten. The amount of data written to the hypervisor's memory is (struct xen memory exchange) out.nr extents bytes.
Triggering CVE-2012-5513 may result in a crash of the hypervisor or corrupting its state. Whether the hypervisor crashes depends on which region of the hypervisor's memory is overwritten. An attacker can specify a memory region for overwriting by storing values in the parameters (struct xen memory exchange) out.extent start and (struct xen memory exchange) out.nr extents. For instance, when we triggered CVE-2012-5513 in our testbed environment, for the values of 0xFFFF808000000000 and 32, and 0xFFFF808000000000 and 16, of (struct xen memory exchange) out.extent start and (struct xen memory exchange) out.nr extents, respectively, the hypervisor crashed. For the values of 0xFFFF808000000000 and 8 of (struct xen memory exchange) out.extent start and (struct xen memory exchange) out.nr extents, the hypervisor continued operating with its memory overwritten.
Hypercall gnttab op
The gnttab op hypercall is used for managing grant tables. Grant tables provide a mechanism for sharing memory between guest VMs (domains in Xen terminology) running on top of a Xen hypervisor; that is, it enables the sharing of page frames by granting page frame access permissions to domains or transferring ownerships of pages between domains. Each domain maintains a grant table, which is shared with the hypervisor. A grant table consists of grant table entries (i.e., grants) indexed by grant references (i.e., grefs). In order to access a page frame for which it needs an access permission, a domain first has to acquire the grant that grants the access permission from the domain that has issued the grant. When an acquired grant is not needed anymore, it is released.
There are version 1 and version 2 grant tables. The format of a grant , where gref is a grant reference, domid is the identification number of domain to which permissions are granted, frame is the MFN of the page frame for which permissions are granted, and flags are the permissions granted (e.g., read, write, or read and write permissions), which are also referred to as status of a grant table entry.
Grant tables of version 2, in addition to grants of the format mentioned above, support transitive grants. Transitive grants are used for granting transitive permissions such that a domain issues a grant that refers to a grant issued by another domain.
For the sake of performance, the status of grant table entries of a grant table of version 2 are stored in status frames, which are separate from the frames where the rest of the grant table entries are stored.
There are shared and active grants. Shared grants are grants issued by a domain. Active grants are grants that are in use (i.e., that are acquired) at a given time. A transitive active grant has the fields trans domain and trans gref, where trans domain is the domain that has issued the grant to which the transitive grant refers, and trans gref is the reference of the grant to which the transitive grant refers.
For in-depth information on the grant table mechanism of the Xen hypervisor we refer the reader to [18] and [21] .
Vulnerability CVE-2012-4539 "Xen 4.0 through 4.2, when running 32-bit x86 PV guests on 64-bit hypervisors, allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and hang or crash) via invalid arguments to GNTTABOP get status frames, aka Grant table hypercall infinite loop DoS vulnerability." [4] GNTTABOP get status frames is an operation of the grant table op hypercall, which is used for retrieving MFNs of status frames (i.e., status frame MFNs) of a domain.
Input: 5 GNTTABOP get status frames takes as input a structure of type gnttab get status frames defined as: struct gnttab get status frames { uint32 t nr frames; domid t dom; int16 t status; XEN GUEST HANDLE(uint64 t) frame list; } nr frames stores the number of requested status frame MFNs; dom stores the identification number of the domain whose status frame MFNs are requested; frame list stores the virtual address of the head of an array where status frame MFNs are to be stored upon successful completion of the GNTTABOP get status frames operation.
Output: 5 On success, a return code is stored in (struct gnttab get status frames) status and the list starting at the address stored in struct gnttab get status frames) frame list is populated with status frame MFNs. On failure, XENMEM populate physmap returns an error code (typically a negative integer value).
Workflow of the vulnerable hypercall handler: 5 compat grant table op(GNTTABOP get status frames, (struct gnttab get status frames) gf, int count = 1) rc = 0 i = 0 for i < count and rc = 0 . . . Description of the vulnerability: In the hypercall handler compat grant table op, a for cycle loops until the value of the variable i, which is initialized to 0, is smaller than the value of the input parameter count, which has to be 1. In compat grant table op, the value of the variable i is incremented to the value of the input parameter (struct gnttab get status frames) nr frames only if (struct gnttab get status frames) status stores the value of the constant variable GNTST okay. The value of (struct gnttab get status frames) status is set in the function gnttab get status frames, which is invoked in compat grant table op. gnttab get status frames sets the value of (struct gnttab get status frames) status to the value of GNTST okay only if the value of the input parameter (struct gnttab get status frames) nr frames is smaller than the number of status frames of the domain whose identification number is stored in the parameter (struct gnttab get status frames) dom.
CVE-2012-4539 can be triggered by invoking GNTTABOP get status frames such that the value of the input parameter (struct gnttab get status frames) nr frames is greater than the number of status frames of the domain whose identification number is stored in the parameter (struct gnttab get status frames) dom. This results in infinite looping of the for cycle in compat grant table op.
In order to trigger CVE-2012-4539, one has to set the value of (struct gnttab get status frames) nr frames to a value greater than nr grants×sizeof (uint16 t) P AGE SIZE
, where nr grants is the number of grants issued by the domain whose identification number is stored in (struct gnttab get status frames) dom, PAGE SIZE is the size of a single page of the domain, and uint16 t is the size of a variable of type unsigned 16-bit integer.
Since the erroneous code is in the handler compat grant table op, CVE-2012-4539 can be triggered only from a 64-bit guest VM running on top of a 32-bit host VM.
Vulnerability fix: A patch fixing the vulnerability CVE-2012-4539 was released on 13 November 2012 and is available at [13] . The patch modifies compat grant table op such that the value of i is set to 1, which is equal to the value of count, if the value of (struct gnttab get status frames) status is not equal to the value of GNTST okay. This prevents the for cycle in compat grant table op from looping indefinitely.
Triggering CVE-2012-4539: We triggered CVE-2012-4539 in the following environment:
• guest VM -OS: Ubuntu Precise (32 bit), kernel 3.8.0-29-generic;
• host VM -OS: Ubuntu Precise (64 bit), kernel 3.8.0-29-generic;
• hypervisor -Xen 4.1.2.
The attack that we executed is depicted in Figure 2 .3. Post-attack state of the hypervisor: When we triggered CVE-2012-4539 in our testbed environment, the guest VM from where we invoked GNTTABOP get status frames hanged. When we issued the xm/xl destroy command to shutdown the non-responsive guest VM, the hypervisor crashed. The hypervisor did not crash when we issued the xm/xl shutdown command to shutdown, and the xm/xl reboot command to reboot, the non-responsive guest VM.
Vulnerability CVE-2012-5510 "Xen 4.x, when downgrading the grant table version, does not properly remove the status page from the tracking list when freeing the page, which allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (hypervisor crash) via unspecified vectors." [5] The GNTTABOP set version is an operation of the grant table op hypercall, which is used for downgrading (from version 2 to version 1) or upgrading (from version 1 to version 2) grant tables.
Input: 6 GNTTABOP set version takes as input a structure of type gnttab set version defined as: struct gnttab set version { uint32 t version; } version stores the version to which the grant table of the domain from where GNT-TABOP set version is invoked is to be set.
Output: 6 On success, GNTTABOP set version returns 0 and the version of the grant table from where GNTTABOP set version has been invoked is stored in (struct gnttab set version) version. On failure, GNTTABOP set version returns an error code (typically a negative integer value).
Workflow 
Section 2. Information on hypercall vulnerabilities
Description of the vulnerability: The function gnttab unpopulate status frames, which is invoked in the handler of the GNTTABOP set version hypercall operation, releases allocated status frames when a grant table is downgraded. However, gnttab unpopulate status frames does not fully perform the procedure for releasing status frames; that is, it does not remove the nodes that are associated with the status frames being released from the xenpage list linked list. xenpage list is a list of nodes that contain information about frames allocated from the hypervisor's heap memory space for the needs of a given guest VM.
Since gnttab unpopulate status frames does not remove from xenpage list the nodes associated with the status frames, subsequent allocation of the same frames leads to adding nodes to xenpage list that are duplicates of the nodes that have not been removed by gnttab unpopulate status frames. This is effectively a corruption of xenpage list. The gnttab populate status frames function, which is invoked in the handler of GNTTABOP set version when a grant table is upgraded, may be used for allocating the same frames that have been released when a grant table has been downgraded.
CVE-2012-5510 can be triggered by continuously allocating and releasing status frames, which eventually leads to corruption of xenpage list; that is, CVE-2012-5510 can be triggered by continuously upgrading and downgrading a grant table. When a corruption of xenpage list occurs depends on the amount of free heap memory of the targeted hypervisor as well as the memory allocating mechanism used.
Vulnerability fix: A patch fixing the vulnerability CVE-2012-5510 was released on 3 December 2012 and is available at [14] . The patch modifies the function gnttab unpopulate status frames such that it inserts an invocation of the function put page. put page removes from xenpage list the nodes associated with the status frames being released when a grant table is downgraded.
Triggering CVE-2012-5510: We triggered CVE-2012-5510 in the following environment:
• host VM -OS: Ubuntu Precise (32 bit), kernel 3.8.0-29-generic;
The attack that we executed is depicted in Figure 2 .4. Post-attack state of the hypervisor: Depending on the use of xenpage list after it has been corrupted, triggering CVE-2012-5510 may result in crash of the targeted hypervisor or may corrupt its state. The hypervisor crashed when we triggered CVE-2012-5510 in our testbed environment.
Vulnerability CVE-2013-1964
"Xen 4.0.x and 4.1.x incorrectly releases a grant reference when releasing a non-v1, non-transitive grant, which allows local guest administrators to cause a denial of service (host crash), obtain sensitive information, or possible have other impacts via unspecified vectors." [8] GNTTABOP copy is an operation of the grant table op hypercall, which is used for copying memory pages from a source domain (SD) (i.e., the domain to which the page being copied is allocated) to a destination domain (DD) (i.e., the domain to which the page is copied) with respect to the data read and write permissions set by the SD and/or the DD using grant tables. GNTTABOP copy can be invoked from the SD, the DD, or a domain that is neither the SD or the DD. The domain from where GNTTABOP copy is invoked is called the local domain, whereas the other domains involved in copying pages are called remote domains.
Input: 7 GNTTABOP copy takes as input a structure of type gnttab copy defined as: . . . } source, dest; uint16 t len; uint16 t flags; int16 t status; } source.u.gmfn stores the GMFN of the page that is to be copied if the SD is a local domain; dest.u.gmfn stores the GMFN of the page of the DD to which a page of the SD is to be copied if the DD is a local domain; source.u.ref stores the grant reference of the grant that grants access to the page that is to be copied if the SD is a remote domain; dest.u.ref stores the grant reference of the grant that grants access to the page of the DD to which a page from the SD is to be copied in case the DD is a remote domain; (source./dest.)u.domid stores the identification number of the SD/DD; len stores the number of bytes to be copied; flags stores a value indicating whether the SD and the DD are local or remote domains.
Output: 7 On success, GNTTABOP copy returns 0. On failure, GNTTABOP copy returns an error code (typically a negative integer value). (struct gnttab copy)status stores a value indicating the status of the page copying operation. Description of the vulnerability: In the handler of the hypercall operation GNT-TABOP copy, the function acquire grant for copy is used for acquiring grants and release grant for copy(d, gref, ...) for releasing grants, where d is the domain that has issued the grant to be released and gref is the reference of the grant to be released. In case a grant of version 2 is acquired, the hypervisor creates an active grant and sets the values of its fields trans domid and trans gref to the identification number of the domain from where GNTTABOP copy has been invoked and 0, respectively. The reason for the latter is to enable scenarios involving, as described in the source code of the handler of GNTTABOP copy, "grant being issued by one domain, sent to another one, and then transitively granted back to the original domain".
The way in which the scenario mentioned above is supported causes non-transitive grants of version 2 to be released as if they were transitive grants (i.e., in a recursive manner). The culprit of this error is that when releasing a grant in the handler of GNTTABOP copy, it is assumed that a transitive grant is a grant whose trans dom field stores a domain identification number that is not equal to the identification number of the domain that has issued the grant being released. However, since the value of the field trans domid of a non-transitive grant is set to the identification number of the domain from where GNTTABOP copy has been invoked when the grant has been acquired, the previously mentioned condition is also true for non-transitive grants of version 2. As a result, when a non-transitive (active) grant of version 2 is released in the handler of GNTTABOP copy, at least one more grant release takes place, where the grant with a grant reference 0, issued by the domain from where GNTTABOP copy has been invoked, is released.
An attacker can trigger CVE-2013-1964 by invoking GNTTABOP copy such that, for example, Section 2. Information on hypercall vulnerabilities a page is copied from a local SD to a remote DD, which has issued a non-transitive grant of version 2. Vulnerability fix: A patch fixing the vulnerability CVE-2013-1964 was released on 18 April 2013 and is available at [17] . The patch modifies acquire grant for copy such that the value of trans domid is set to the identification number of the domain that issued the grant that is acquired. Further, the value of trans gref is set to the reference of the grant that is acquired. These modifications of acquire grant for copy prevent the recursive release of non-transitive grant of version 2.
Triggering CVE-2013-1964: We triggered CVE-2013-1964 in the following environment:
The attack that we executed is depicted in Figure 2 .5.
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Hypercall set debugreg
Vulnerability CVE-2012-3494 "The set debugreg hypercall in include/asm-x86/debugreg.h in Xen 4.0, 4.1, and 4.2, and Citrix XenServer 6.0.2 and earlier, when running on x86-64 systems, allows local OS guest users to cause a denial of service (host crash) by writing to the reserved bits of the DR7 debug control register." [1] The set debugreg hypercall is used for setting the value of the DR7 register of a CPU allocated to a guest VM. The DR7 register is used for controlling the actions of a CPU when program debugging is performed (e.g., for setting data and/or instruction breakpoints). The addresses at which breakpoints are set in a given debugging session are stored in the registers DR0 -DR3.
The layout of the DR7 register of a 64-bit machine is as follows:
Section 2. Information on hypercall vulnerabilities
The upper 32 bits are reserved and should always be cleared. The LENx and R/Wx fields are used for specifying the length of the monitored data items when a data breakpoint is set (e.g., 00: one-byte length -also when an instruction breakpoint is set, 01: two-byte length) and the type of program execution break set (e.g., 00 -instruction break, 01 -break on data write, 11 -break on data read and write), respectively. The GE (global exact) and/or the LE (local exact) bits are set when a data breakpoint is set and instruct the CPU to slow down the execution of the program being debugged so that the exact instruction that triggers the data breakpoint can be reported to the debugging program. The Gx and Lx bits are used for enabling or disabling breakpoints set at the addresses stored in the registers DR0 -DR3.
Input: 8 set debugreg takes as input a number of a register (an integer value, 7 is used for specifying the DR7 register) and a value that is to be stored in the register (an unsigned long integer value).
Output: 8 On success, set debugreg returns 0. On failure, set debugreg returns an error code (typically a negative integer value).
Workflow of the vulnerable hypercall handler: 8 do set debugreg (int reg nr, unsigned long value)
call set debugreg(reg nr, value) if reg nr = 7 value &=˜DR CONTROL RESERVED ZERO . . . store value in DR7 return return Description of the vulnerability: In the handler of the set debugreg hypercall, the value of the variable˜DR CONTROL RESERVED ZERO is applied as a mask with the binary bitwise AND operator to the value of the second parameter of set debugreg. The latter is performed so that the upper 32 bits of the value that is to be stored in the DR7 register are cleared. DR CONTROL RESERVED ZERO, which stores the value of 0x0000d800ul, translates to the binary value of bit63 (0...0) bit31 (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (1101) (1000) (0000) (0000) bit0 . The complement form of the previously mentioned binary number is: bit63 (1...1) bit31 (1111) (1111) (1111) (1111) (0010) (0111) (1111) (1111) bit0 , which is stored in the variable˜DR CONTROL RESERVED ZERO. Since they are set to 1, the upper 32 bits of DR CONTROL RESERVED ZERO do not clear the upper 32 bits of the value that is to be stored in the DR7 register when applied as a mask with the binary bitwise AND operator. This results in setting one or multiple bits of the upper 32 bits of the DR7 register to 1, which is not allowed according to hardware specifications.
CVE-2012-3494 can be triggered by invoking set debugreg in a way such that one or multiple bits of the upper 32 bits of the value of the second parameter of set debugreg are set to 1. The bits of the second parameter of set debugreg that are used for setting data or instruction breakpoints (e.g., the bits of the LENx fields) should store binary values for setting an instruction breakpoint.
Vulnerability fix:
A patch fixing the vulnerability CVE-2012-3494 was released on 5 September 2012 and is available at [10] .
The patch assigns the value of˜0xffff27fful to DR CONTROL RESERVED ZERO, and thus, the variablẽ DR CONTROL RESERVED ZERO, which is applied as a mask to the value of the second parameter of set debugreg, has the binary value of bit63 (0...0) bit31 (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0010) (0111) (1111) (1111) bit0 . Since the upper 32 bits of˜DR CONTROL RESERVED ZERO are cleared, applying˜DR CONTROL RESERVED ZERO as a mask to the value of the second parameter of set debugreg with the binary bitwise AND operator clears the upper 32 bits of the parameter.
Triggering CVE-2012-3494: We triggered CVE-2012-3494 in the following environment:
• guest VM -OS: Ubuntu Precise (32 bit), kernel 3. Post-attack state of the hypervisor: Given that in current systems the upper 32 bits of the DR7 register are reserved and should be cleared, triggering CVE-2012-3494 results in crash of the vulnerable hypervisor. However, an outcome different than crash of the hypervisor may be possible if a vulnerable hypervisor is run on future hardware, as stated in [3] : "if the vulnerable hypervisor is run on future hardware, the impact of the vulnerability might be widened depending on the future assignment of the currently-reserved debug register bits."
Hypercall physdev op
Vulnerability CVE-2012-3495 "The physdev get free pirq hypercall in arch/x86/physdev.c in Xen 4.1.x and Citrix XenServer 6.0.2 and earlier uses the return value of the get free pirq function as an array index without checking that the return value indicates an error, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (invalid memory write and host crash) and possibly gain privileges via unspecified vectors." [2] PHYSDEVOP get free pirq is an operation of the physdev op hypercall, which is used for allocating PIRQ (PCI IRQs -Peripheral Component Interconnect Interrupt ReQuests) for the needs of a given guest VM. The Xen hypervisor maintains an array called pirq irq for each guest VM that it hosts. pirq irq is used for marking a given PIRQ as allocated such that the value of the constant variable PIRQ ALLOCATED (i.e., -1) is stored in the node of pirq irq of index equal to the allocated PIRQ.
Input: 9 PHYSDEVOP get free pirq takes as input structure of type physdev get free pirq defined as: struct physdev get free pirq { int type; uint32 t pirq; } type stores the type of the PIRQ to be allocated (i.e., MAP PIRQ TYPE GSI or MAP PIRQ TYPE MSI ).
Output: 9 On success, PHYSDEVOP get free pirq returns 0 and the allocated PIRQ is stored in (struct physdev get free pirq) pirq. On failure, -28 is stored in (struct physdev get free pirq) pirq and XENMEM populate physmap returns an error code (typically a negative integer value).
Workflow of the vulnerable hypercall handler: 9 do physdev op (PHYSDEVOP get free pirq, (struct physdev get free pirq) gfp)
. Description of the vulnerability: In the handler of the PHYSDEVOP get free pirq hypercall operation, the function get free pirq is invoked for allocating a PIRQ. The return value of get free pirq is the allocated PIRQ, if a PIRQ has been succesfully allocated, or an error code (i.e., -28) if a PIRQ could not be allocated. The return value of get free pirq is used as an index to access an element of the array pirq irq for marking a PIRQ as allocated. However, the return value of get free pirq is not checked whether it is a PIRQ or an error code. In case get free pirq returns an error code, the error code is used as an array index and as a result the value of the constant variable PIRQ ALLOCATED (i.e., -1) is written at the memory address &pirq irq -28, which is a location in hypervisor's memory.
CVE-2012-3495 can be triggered by attempting to allocate a PIRQ when there are no available PIRQs. This can be achieved by invoking the hypercall operation PHYSDEVOP get free pirq multiple times until all available PIRQs are allocated and an attempt is made to allocate a PIRQ when there are no available PIRQs. Since PIRQs that can be allocated to a given VM are in the range of 16 to the value of the variable nr pirqs gsi, a variable in hypervisor context that stores the largest PIRQ that can be allocated to a given VM, invoking PHYSDEVOP get free pirq (nr pirqs gsi -16) + 2) times is sufficient for triggering CVE-2012-3495.
Vulnerability fix: A patch fixing the vulnerability CVE-2012-3495 was released on 5 September 2012 and is available at [11] . The patch inserts an if clause that checks whether the return value of the get free pirq() function is a PIRQ. If get free pirq() returns an error code, the error code is not used as an index for accessing an element of the pirq irq array.
Triggering CVE-2012-3495: We triggered CVE-2012-3495 in the following environment:
• guest VM -OS: Ubuntu Precise (32 bit), kernel 3.8.0-29-generic; • host VM -OS: Ubuntu Precise (32 bit), kernel 3.8.0-29-generic; • hypervisor -Xen 4.1.2.
The attack that we executed is depicted in Figure 2 .7.
Post-attack state of the hypervisor: Triggering CVE-2012-3495 results in overwriting the hypervisor's memory at the memory address &pirq irq -28 with the value of the variable PIRQ ALLOCATED (i.e., -1). An attacker cannot control the value written in the hypervisor's memory. Depending on the memory layout of the hypervisor, the hypervisor may crash or continue operating in a corrupted state. When we triggered CVE-2012-3495 in our testbed environment, the hypervisor continued operating in a corrupted state. The get page from gfn function provides information about a given memory page. It is invoked in the handlers of multiple hypercalls of the Xen hypervisor, one of which is the handler of the MMUEXT CLEAR PAGE operation of the mmuext op hypercall. MMUEXT CLEAR PAGE is an operation of the mmuext op hypercall, which is used for clearing memory pages/frames.
Input: 10 MMUEXT CLEAR PAGE takes as input structure of type mmuext op defined as: struct mmuext op { unsigned int cmd; union { xen pfn t mfn; . . . } arg1;
. . . } cmd stores a number identifying an operation of the mmuext op hypercall (e.g., MMUEXT CLEAR PAGE ); arg1.mfn stores the MFN of the page that is to be cleared.
Output: 10 On success, MMUEXT CLEAR PAGE returns 0.
On failure, MMUEXT CLEAR PAGE returns an error code (typically a negative integer value).
Workflow of the vulnerable hypercall handler: 10 do mmuext op ((struct mmuext op) op, ...) struct page info page; call page = get page from gfn(op.arg1.mfn, ...) . . . return Description of the vulnerability: get page from gfn reads information about a page allocated to a guest VM from the frame table of the VM using the MFN of the page as offset. A Section 2. Information on hypercall vulnerabilities frame table is a memory area shared between the hypervisor and a guest VM where information about each page allocated to the guest VM is stored in the format of a structure of type page info.
The MFN used by get page from gfn for reading page information is provided to get page from gfn as an input parameter. The value of the MFN provided as input parameter to get page from gfn is not checked for validity. Since get page from gfn uses a MFN as an offset for reading from the frame table of a given guest VM, an invalid MFN is a MFN that causes a buffer over-read (i.e., that is larger than the largest MFN at which a page of the guest VM is allocated). An attacker can provide an invalid MFN as an input parameter to get page from gfn, in which case get page from gfn returns invalid page information.
In the handler of the MMUEXT CLEAR PAGE hypercall operation, the MFN stored in the input parameter (struct mmuext op) arg1.mfn is provided to get page from gfn for reading page information. CVE-2012-5525 can be triggered by invoking MMUEXT CLEAR PAGE such that an invalid MFN is stored in (struct mmuext op) arg1.mfn.
Vulnerability fix: A patch fixing the vulnerability CVE-2012-5525 was released on 3 December 2012 and is available at [16] . The patch inserts an invocation of the function mfn valid in get page from gfn, which verifies the validity of the MFN provided as input to get page from gfn. The patch modifies get page from gfn such that if the MFN used for reading page information is not valid, get page from gfn returns NULL instead of invalid page information.
Triggering CVE-2012-5525: We triggered CVE-2012-5525 in the following environment:
• guest VM -OS: Ubuntu Precise (32 bit), kernel 3. The attack that we executed is depicted in Figure 2 .8.
Post-attack state of the hypervisor: Triggering CVE-2012-5525 may result in a crash of the targeted hypervisor or may corrupt its state. Whether the hypervisor crashes depends on the use of the invalid page information returned from get page from gfn when CVE-2012-5525 is triggered. The hypervisor crashed when we triggered CVE-2012-5525 in our testbed environment.
